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  The Recognition of the Syrian National Coalition under International Law:  
   Whether the National Coalition Can Receive Arms 
     Daniel Strashun 
     I. Introduction 
 
 In December of 2010, a Tunisian street vendor set himself on fire in front of a 
government building in Tunisia in response to the humiliating confiscation of his goods.
1
  This 
act sparked protests that quickly spread to Tunisia’s capital and caused Tunisian President Zine 
al-Abidine Ben Ali to flee to Saudi Arabia.
2
  The Tunisian uprising was the first genuine 
revolution in the Arab world, which later provoked the ouster of the leaders of Egypt, Yemen 
and Libya.
3
  It was generally believed that the uprisings in the Arab world would not spread to 
Syria because the Syrian government had the support of its religious minorities and had a 
previous reputation of torturing dissidents.
4
  Yet, on March 15, 2013, the Syrian Arab Spring 
marked its second anniversary.   
 After two years of fighting, the Syrian uprising has created a humanitarian crisis that has 
resulted in the death of over 70,000 Syrians and the displacement of almost three and a half 
million refugees.
5
  In addition, over two million Syrian children have been ravaged by disease, 
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 Associated Press, A Nation-by-Nation Look at Arab Spring Dictators and Their Fate, 
HAARETZ, Jun 2, 2012, http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/a-nation-by-nation-look-at-
arab-spring-dictators-and-their-fate-1.433990. 
4
 GELVIN, Supra, note 1, at 102.  
5
 Office of the Spokesperson, U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheet, U.S. Government Assistance 
to Syria, Mar. 4, 2013, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/03/205623.htm. [hereinafter March 
2013 Fact Sheet]. 
 2 
malnutrition and trauma.
6
  Some foreign policy scholars predict that the Syrian infighting could 
continue for more than three years before it is resolved.
7
  
 Since 1970, when Hafez al-Assad, an Alawi military officer, led a coup d’état and 
overthrew the Syrian president, the Assad family has notoriously governed Syria through the use 
of barbaric tactics to ensure the obedience and loyalty of it citizens.
8
  For example, from 1979 
until 1982, the Sunni Muslims led an unsuccessful insurrection that took place in Aleppo and 
Hama.
9
  After the Muslim Brotherhood unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate Assad, Assad’s 
younger brother, Rifaat called for an all out war and proclaimed that the regime would be ready 
to kill one million Syrians to defend its rule.
10
  Ultimately, the revolt was suppressed, but not 
before the Syrian military was accused of murdering tens of thousands of civilians.
11
  In 2000, 
Hafez al-Assad passed away and his son Bashar succeeded him, continuing his father’s legacy.12  
According to the Human Rights Watch, the Assad regime established 27 “torture centers” in 
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Malnutrition, CNN, Mar. 13, 2013, available at 
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Syria.
13
  Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan controversially referred to Bashar Assad’s 
recent “cruelty that was a response to people in Hama, Homs and Deraa” as the inheritance he 
received from his father.
14
  
 While Bashar Assad’s government continues to rule Syria, the Syrian opposition 
movement in Syria has increased its legitimacy.  In November 2012, several of the major 
opposition forces united as the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition 
Forces (“the National Coalition”).  The National Coalition continues to gain international support 
and has been internationally recognized by the United States, the United Kingdom, France and 
the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) as the “legitimate representative” of the Syrian people.15  
While these acts of recognition were an important preliminary step for the National Coalition, it 
does not allow the international community to grant the rebels lethal aid.
16
  This paper will 
explore the critical issue of why the Syrian insurgency has not been able to receive military aid 
to date, even though it achieved international recognition. 
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 Ole Salvange et al., Torture Archipelago Arbitrary Arrests, Torture, and Enforced 
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Radwan Ziadeh, Visiting Scholar, Kennedy School of Government at Harvard 
University)(stating the scale of torture and other ill-treatment in Syria has risen to a level not 
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15
 Syria Profile, Supra, note 11.  see also Aljazeera, GCC Recognizes New Syrian Opposition 
Bloc, Nov, 12, 2012, 
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 Section II of this paper will explain what “recognition” means and what the different 
levels of recognition accomplish under international law.  It will also apply the concept of 
recognition to the events of the Libyan Arab Spring.  Section III will trace the development of 
the opposition’s formation of the National Coalition.  Section IV will analyze the current legal 
status of the National Coalition under international law and will explain why the rebels have not 
been able to receive military aid even though they gained international recognition.  Section V 
will offer suggestions for the success of the National Coalition and potential roadblocks it will 
encounter under international law.  Finally, Section VI will offer predictions for the future of the 
Syrian opposition movement and discuss its connection to the greater Arab Spring movement.  
 
  II.  Background of the Principle of International Recognition  
  A. The Legal Background of the Principle of International Recognition 
 
 The principle of “recognition” does not have an established, consistent definition and is 
an “eccentric area [that] is subject to various pronouncements of varying degrees of 
generality.” 17   As British Prime Minister Winston Churchill once wrote to United States 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt concerning the recognition of the French Committee of 
National Liberation: “What does recognition mean?  One can recognize a man as an Emperor or 
as a grocer.  Recognition is meaningless without a defining formula.”18  The act of “recognition” 
                                                 
17
 Ian Brownlie, Recognition in Theory and Practice, 53 BYBIL 197-198, 201 (1982). 
[hereinafter, Brownlie]. 
18
 2 WINSTON CHURCHILL, THE SECOND WORLD WAR 137 (1954); II FRUS 173.  
 5 
of a new government by an established government has multiple meanings with varied levels of 
legal and political significance depending on its context.
19
   
 “Diplomatic recognition,” the most legally significant form of recognition, refers to the 
willingness of the recognizing state to enter into a formal diplomatic relationship with the newly 
created entity.
20
  It allows the two governments to exchange ambassadors and to establish 
embassies and makes the newly formed entity responsible for treaty obligations.
21
  In addition, 
under the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations, the recognized 
government would be obligated to physically protect the recognizing government’s embassy and 
provide freedom of access to the embassy for all foreign nationals.
22
  Recognition could also be 
an informal means of expressing political support for the new entity or a way to express an 
opinion on the group’s legal standing.23 
 An insurgent group can be “recognized” under two legally significant standards.  It can 
be recognized as either the “representative of a nation’s people” or as the “representative of a 
state.”  Recognition of an insurgent group as the “representatives of a nation’s people” implies 
                                                 
19
 Stefan Talmon, “Recognition of the Libyan National Transitional Council,” American Society 
of International Law Insights 15 (16) (2011), 1. [hereinafter, Recognition]. 
20
 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 202 (1987) (Recognition of 
statehood is a formal acknowledgment by another state that an entity possesses the qualifications 
for statehood as set forth in § 201, and implies a commitment to treat that entity as a state); see 
e.g. Address of US Secretary of State Acheson to the Pan American Society of the USA, New 
York, Sept 19, 1949, “our long-range objectives … may, in fact, be best served by recognizing it 
[the new government] and thus maintaining a channel of communication with the country 
involved….our act of recognition need not necessarily be understood as the forerunner of a 
policy of intimate cooperation with the government concerned” (Whiteman (ed.), Digest of 
International Law (1963), ii, 5. 
21
 Recognition, Supra, note 19. 
22
 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 22, April 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 (entered 
into force Apr. 24, 1964)[hereinafter, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations]; Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations art. 5, adopted Apr. 24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 (entered into 
force with respect to the United States of America Dec. 14, 1967). 
23
 Recognition, Supra, note 19, at 2.  
 6 
the entity did not satisfy the legal criteria necessary to be recognized as a state and the 
recognition is not legally or diplomatically significant.
24
  It represents a politically significant 
event that can boost the morale of the insurgents.
25
  
 Stefan Talmon, professor of Public International Law at Oxford University, argues that 
the recognition of an insurgent group as the “representatives of a nation’s people” provides it 
with four key political advantages:  
  (1) it grants legitimacy to their struggle against the incumbent government; (2) it  
  provides international acceptance; (3) it allows the insurgents to speak on behalf  
  on the nation’s people in international organizations and allows it to represent it in 
  other States by opening “representative offices;” and (4) usually results in the  
  grant of economic aid.
26
  
 
In contrast, recognition of an insurgency as the “representative of a state” demonstrates that the 
insurgent group represents the nation in some legal or diplomatic capacity.
27
  Consequently, the 
recognizing state must de-recognize the incumbent government and end formal diplomatic 
relations with the incumbent government.
28
  That includes handing over the foreign embassy to 
the insurgents, and if requested to do so by the insurgents, ending the diplomatic status of the 
incumbent government’s diplomats.29  
 In 1947, Hersh Lauterpacht, a former member of the United Nations’ International Law 
Commission and a former judge of the International Court of Justice, developed the following 
four pre-conditions necessary to recognize insurgent movements: 
                                                 
24
 see Brownlie, Supra, note 17, at 198. 
25
 Jill Dougherty, What Will Recognizing the Opposition Accomplish, CNN SECURITY 
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 Recognition, Supra, note 19, at 2.   
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 First, there must exist within the State an armed conflict of a general (as distinguished 
 from a purely local) character; secondly, the insurgents must occupy and administer a   
 portion of national territory; thirdly, they must conduct the hostilities in accordance with 
 the rules of war and through organized armed forces acting under a responsible authority; 
 fourthly, there must exist circumstances which make it necessary for outside States to 
 define their attitude by means of recognition of belligerency.
30
  
 
Recognizing states rarely use Lauterpacht’s criteria as a formal means of recognition.31 
 The criteria to qualify for insurgent recognition does not have to be established by 
international law.
32
  For example, African nations began to seek independence from their former 
European colonists.  In 1963, the Organization of African Unity’s Coordinating Committee for 
the Liberation of Africa (the “OAU”) developed criteria to recognize insurgents as the sole 
legitimate representative of a people.
33
  An insurgent group that fulfilled these criteria would be 
eligible for financial and moral assistance.
34
  
 The OAU established that the insurgency must be a “United Action Front” fighting 
against the incumbent power, meaning it must be “broadly based, have effective following and 
popular support” throughout the country and “have reasonable fighting strength.” 35   Stated 
differently, a state can recognize an insurgency if it has the authority to “control and govern a 
substantial part of the state territory” and has the power to “engage in a widespread armed 
                                                 
30
 Hersh Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law 176-178 (1947). 
31
 See Sam Foster Halabi, Traditions of Belligerent Recognition: The Libyan Intervention in 
Historical and Theoretical Context, 27 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 321, 332 (2012) (quoting Richard A. 
Falk, The Six Legal Dimensions of the Vietnam War) (1968)). 
32
 STEFAN TALMON, RECOGNITION OF GOVERNMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: WITH 
PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO GOVERNMENTS IN EXILE 30 n. 48 (2001) [hereinafter Talmon]. 
33
 General Report of the Goodwill Mission of the Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of 
Africa to the Angolan Nationalists, Léopoldville, July 13-15, 1964, reprinted in John A. Marcum, 
the Angolan Revolution vol 2: exile, politics and guerilla warfare (1962-1976), Appendix 2, at 
304-307.  
34
 Talmon, Supra, note 32. 
35
 Mohamed A.E. Yousef, “Security Council Resolution 1973: A New Interpretation of the 
Notion of Protection of Civilians?” in 82 ARAB SPRING: NEW PATTERNS FOR DEMOCRACY AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 160 (ed., 2013). 
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conflict.”36   These criteria are helpful to understand the complexities of recognition of the 
insurgent groups in the context of the Libyan and Syrian Arab Spring.  
 
   B. Insurgent Recognition Applied to the Libyan Arab Spring 
 
 In the context of the Libyan Arab Spring, some countries in the international community 
recognized the Libyan National Transitional Council (“NTC”) even though it did not completely 
fulfill these criteria.  The Libyan Arab Spring began in mid-February of 2011 when the Libyan 
people began to riot in Benghazi in response to the arrest of human rights activist Fethi Tarbel, 
who had worked to free political prisoners.
37
  Only a few weeks later, on March 5, 2011, the 
NTC met in Benghazi and declared itself as the “sole representative for Libya.”38  
 On March 10, 2011, France became the first country to recognize the rebel forces as the 
“legitimate representative of the Libyan people.”39  Then, on March 28, 2011, Qatar became the 
first Arab nation to recognize the Libyan rebels as the “legitimate representative of the Libyan 
people.”40  By mid-June of 2011, Turkey, Jordan, Germany and Spain also recognized the rebels 
as the “legitimate representative of the Libyan people.”41   
                                                 
36
 Liesbeth Zegveld, The Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in International Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 2. [hereinafter Zegveld]. 
37
 Reuters, Timeline: Libya's Uprising against Muammar Gaddafi, Aug. 21, 2011, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/21/us-libya-events-idUSTRE77K2QH2011082. 
[hereinafter Timeline]. 
38
 Id. 
39
 Alan Cowell and Steven Erlanger, France Becomes First Country to Recognize Libyan Rebels, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/11/world/europe/11france.html?_r=0. [hereinafter Cowell and 
Erlanger]. 
40
 Timeline, Supra, note 37. 
41
 Recognition, Supra, note 19, at 2.  
 9 
 Under international law, a nation can only have one de jure government.
42
  A nation, 
however, can have one de jure government and a representative of the nation’s people or a de 
facto government.
43
  The recognition of the Libyan rebels, however, did not affect the 
recognizing nations’ official diplomatic relations with the Qaddafi regime.44  At that time, the 
Qaddafi regime remained the only Libyan government that had the authority to appoint Libyan 
ambassadors, “legally dispose of Libyan state assets abroad” and legally transfer title to State 
controlled oil and gas resources.
45
 
 Until the summer of 2011, the United States did not to grant any form of recognition to 
the NTC.  In April 2011, the United States Ambassador to Libya stated, “Recognition remains a 
legal and an international obligations issue that we’re still studying, and we have not made a 
definitive determination on that question… [W]e’re a very legalistic country and we’re looking 
at all the different complexity… of that question.”46 He further remarked there were issues with 
respect to “what constitutes a government” and what constitutes “precedence in United States 
history for recognition.”47  Even as late as May 12, 2011, the United States remained hesitant to 
recognize the Libyan rebels and felt there were potential “legal hurdles” to recognition.48  
 For the past few decades, the foreign policy of the United States, the United Kingdom 
and most other countries has been to only recognize newly created “states,” but not newly 
                                                 
42
 Id.  A de jure government is “[a] functioning government that is legally established.” 
GOVERNMENT, Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009), de jure government. 
43
 Id.  A de facto government is “[a]n independent government established and exercised by a 
group of a country's inhabitants who have separated themselves from the parent state.” 
GOVERNMENT, Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009), de facto government. 
44
 Id. 
45
 Id. 
46
  Press Release, U.S. State Department, The Political Situation in Libya, Special Briefing, Gene 
Cretz, Ambassador to Libya (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/161878.htm. 
47
 Id. 
48
 U.S. State Department, Daily Press Briefing, Statement by Mark C. Toner, Acting Dept. 
Spokesman (May 12, 2011), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2011/05/163280.htm. 
 10 
formed “governments.”49  For example, if a new “geographic territory comes into existence,” 
such as Kosovo or Montenegro, the United States would decide whether to recognize the new 
state.
50
  The United States and most other countries have generally avoided getting involved with 
the complicated diplomatic issues of recognizing insurgencies as legitimate governments.
51
 
 The United States State Department likely believed that “legal hurdles” to recognition 
existed because recognition of the NTC would constitute an “unusual departure” from its prior 
diplomatic practice of not recognizing insurgencies in any form.
52
  In addition, the NTC did not 
have broad popular support throughout Libya and did not control or govern a substantial part of 
the Libyan territory.
53
  Politically and geographically, it was not “truly inclusive” of the Libyan 
people.
54
  If the United States had recognized the NTC without the NTC’s fulfillment of those 
criteria, it likely would have constituted an “illegal interference” in the internal affairs of Libya, 
a violation of the non-intervention principle of the Charter of the United Nations.
55
 
                                                 
49
 John B. Bellinger III, Legal Questions in U.S. Nod to Libya's Opposition, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN REL. (July 18, 2011), available at http://www.cfr.org/libya/legal-questions-us-nod-
libyas-opposition/p25489?cid=oth_partner_site-atlantic-firstake-legal_questions_in_us_ nod_to-
071811. [hereinafter Legal Questions]. 
50
 Id. 
51
 Id. 
52
 U.N. Rules, Supra, note 16. 
53
 Legal Questions, Supra, note 49. 
54
 William Wan and William Booth, United States Recognizes Libyan Rebels as Legitimate 
Government, WASH. POST, July 15, 2011, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-07-
15/world/35237622_1_rebel-council-libyan-rebel-mahmoud-shammam. [hereinafter Wan and 
Booth]. 
55
 See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, princ. 2, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970), http://daccess 
ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=A/RES/2625(XXV)&Lang=E&Area=RESOLUTION 
(stating that “No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any 
reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs  of any other State. Consequently, armed 
intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the 
State or against its political, economic and cultural elements, are in violation of international 
law.”) [hereinafter Declaration on Principles of International Law]. 
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 Yet, on July 15, 2011, the United States formally recognized the NTC as the “legitimate 
government of Libya.”56  The United Kingdom followed the United States and proclaimed the 
NTC as the “sole governmental authority” in Libya and dismissed all Qaddafi diplomats.57  
Under international law, an insurgent group can only be formally recognized as the government 
of a state if it exercised “effective control over the State’s territory.”58  As of June 2011, the NTC 
controlled only the eastern parts of Libya, but the Qaddafi government retained control of 
Tripoli, the capital, and the western parts.
59
  At the time the United States recognized the NTC, it 
did not control a “substantial part” of Libyan territory and could not claim to have “broad 
support” among the Libyan people.60   
 According to John B. Bellinger III, a former legal adviser to the State Department, the 
United States recognition of the NTC was “especially unusual” under international law because 
the NTC did not fulfill the criteria necessary for recognition as a de jure government.
61
  In 
addition, although the United States declared that the Qaddafi regime “no longer has any 
legitimate authority in Libya,” the regime was still a functioning government.62  The recognition 
thus also raised serious concerns concerning the principle of non-intervention.  
 The State Department was aware of the legal challenges that recognition of the NTC 
would raise.  Former United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton astutely cautioned that 
there were “various legal issues that remain to be worked through.”63  Less than a month before 
                                                 
56
 Timeline, Supra, note 37. 
57
 BBC News, UK Expels Gaddafi diplomats and Recognizes Libya Rebels, July 27, 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-14306544.  [hereinafter UK Expels]. 
58
 Recognition, Supra, note 19, at 4. 
59
 Id. 
60
 Legal Questions, Supra, note 49. 
61
 Id. 
62
 Id. 
63
 Id. 
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the United States decided to recognize the NTC, Harold Koh, the legal adviser to the State 
Department during President Barack Obama’s first term, remarked: 
 “As a general rule, we are reluctant to recognize entities that do not control entire 
 countries because then they are responsible for parts of the country that they don’t 
 control…[a]nd we are reluctant to de-recognize leaders who still control parts of the  
 country because then you’re absolving them of responsibility in the areas that they do 
 control.”64 
  
 The “legal issues” that the United States dealt with related to the international obligations 
of Libya, such as who had responsibility for Libya’s treaty obligations.65  In addition, there were 
concerns the Qaddafi regime would be absolved from liability under the Vienna Convention and 
international human rights laws.
66
  There were also diplomatic consequences of recognition such 
as whether the United States would enter into formal diplomatic relations with the NTC.
67
  
However, Qaddafi was killed in October of 2011; and in August of 2012, the NTC transferred 
their power to a newly elected assembly, ending the legal debate.
68
  
  The United States recognized the NTC, even though they knew it would raise many 
complicated international law questions.
69
  Bellinger III claimed recognition of the NTC would 
be a means to provide it with greater political support, since the United States military support 
for the NTC was minimal.
70
  Similarly, William Hague, the Foreign Secretary of the United 
                                                 
64
 Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 112th Cong., 39 
(2011) (statement of Harold Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State). 
65
 Legal Questions, Supra, note 49. 
66
 Jason Ukman, U.S. Recognition of New Libyan Government Raises Tough Legal Questions, 
WASH. POST CHECKPOINT, July 19, 2011, http:// www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/checkpoint-
washington/post/us-recognition-of-new-libyan-government-raises-tough-legal-
questions/2011/07/19/gIQAb9BdNI_blog.html.  [hereinafter, Ukman]. 
67
 Legal Questions, Supra, note 49. 
68
 BBC, Libya's NTC Hands Power to Newly Elected Assembly, August 9, 2012, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-19183300. 
69
 Legal Questions, Supra, note 49. 
70
 Ukman, Supra, note 66. 
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Kingdom, maintained that the United Kingdom recognized the NTC as the “sole governmental 
authority” of Libya because it was a “unique situation.”71  Both the United States and the United 
Kingdom believed that recognition of the NTC would allow their governments to economically 
benefit the NTC through the ability to turn over frozen Libyan assets to the NTC, the recognized 
government of Libya.
72
   
 Despite concerns by members of the United States Congress that the recognition of the 
NTC was “premature” and there would be no accountability for the transfer of the unfrozen 
assets, the United States felt recognition was critical politically.
73
  The turning point to the 
decision of the United States to grant recognition to the NTC was a presentation given in Turkey 
that outlined the rebels’ plan for a government that would be inclusive of the Libyan nation in a 
post-Qaddafi Libya.
74
  The legal recognition of the NTC as the “legitimate government of Libya” 
was an oddity in foreign policy, and it remains to be seen if it will be relied upon as diplomatic 
precedent for recognition of an insurgent group.  Although the OAU criteria for insurgent 
recognition were not closely followed by the recognizing nations during the recognition of the 
NTC, they were adhered to in the recognition of the Syrian insurgency.  
 
   III. Development of the National Coalition’s Formation 
 
 In early March of 2011, a group of Syrian boys ages 10 to 15 scribbled some anti-Assad 
graffiti on the walls in Dara’a and were subsequently abused and tortured by Syrian military 
                                                 
71
 UK Expels, Supra, note 57.  
72
 Id. 
73
 Wan and Booth, Supra, note 54. 
74
 Id. 
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officials.
75
  In response to the disproportional brutality, the people of Dera’a protested the 
regime’s actions chanting “peaceful, peaceful,” thus sparking the Syrian uprising.76  These anti-
regime protests quickly spread to Banyas, Homs and the suburbs of Damascus, where the Assad 
regime responded through the use of military tanks to crush these protests.
77
  
 In October of 2011, in an attempt to create a united front against the Assad regime, 
opposition forces formed the Syrian National Council (the “SNC”).78   The SNC sought to 
represent an inclusive cross-section of Syria society and consisted of six members from the local 
coordination committees, five members from the Muslim Brotherhood and the tribes, five 
“independents,” four Kurds, four liberal secularists, one Christian, and one Assyrian.79   
 Instead of focusing its efforts on gaining internal legitimacy within Syria, the SNC hoped 
securing external recognition would boost its credibility within Syria.
80
  The SNC became 
dependent on international support and failed to create sustainable political leadership on the 
ground in Syria.
81
  In addition, the SNC failed to unify the numerous rebel militias, a condition 
the Friends of Syria (“FOS”) nations placed on the SNC before they would grant it financial 
assistance.  Thus the SNC could not claim to represent the “bulk of the opposition.”82 
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 The SNC also sought to gain control over the large but unstructured Free Syrian Army 
(the “FSA”), which was led by defecting Air Force Colonel Riad al-Assad.83  In September of 
2011, the SNC attempted to create a Joint Military Command of Revolutionary Military 
Councils, which would control 75 to 80 percent of the armed rebels, but it could not persuade the 
prominent Islamic brigades or credible commanders such as the heads of the Homs and Aleppo 
Military Councils to join their “unified command.”84  
 Ultimately, the SNC did not unify the opposition because it could not gain support from 
“key minorities, religious and tribal figures,” the business community or the rebel fighters.85  The 
SNC’s inability to unify the opposition led Hilary Clinton to declare that the SNC could “no 
longer be viewed as the visible leader of the opposition” and the Western nations did not trust it 
to distribute any contributions for humanitarian assistance.
86
 
 The Syrian opposition sought to create a more diversified body that could earn 
widespread international recognition and domestic legitimacy.
87
  Seeking military and economic 
aid, in November of 2012, about 90 percent of the opposition groups, including the SNC, united 
to form the 60 seat National Coalition.
88
  It reserved seats for various ethnic and minority groups 
that were absent from the SNC, including three for the Kurdish community represented by the 
National Kurdish Council, three for the Turkmen community and one for the Syria Business 
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Forum.
89
  The National Coalition also reserved seats for representatives of each of Syria’s 14 
provinces and reserved up to five seats for the Alawite Community, an important minority group, 
because President Assad is a member of that sect of Shiite Muslims.
90
  However, jihadist rebel 
groups, such as the Jabhat al-Nusra refused to join the National Coalition.
91
  
 Although the National Coalition claimed to “more broadly” represent the opposition than 
the SNC, the facts do not support the claim.
92
  The opposition inside Syria holds 20 percent of 
the seats in the general secretariat, the leadership body of National Coalition, and a slightly lower 
figure than the 35 percent it held in the leadership body of the SNC.
93
  In addition, although the 
National Council allocated 14 seats to the representatives from each of Syria’s 14 provinces, 
only two of these representatives were physically based in Syria.
94
  
 At the National Coalition’s first general assembly in Cairo, SNC members and associates 
constituted 60 percent of the delegates and failed to gain representation from the Syrian Kurdish 
Opposition parties.
95
  The National Coalition’s composition led one commentator to remark, 
“there was a large element of make-believe,” when the FOS recognized the National Coalition as 
the “sole legitimate representative of the Syrian people,” when it previously denied recognition 
to the SNC.
96
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   IV.  Current Legal Status of the National Coalition    
 
 When United States President Barack Obama recognized the National Coalition as the 
“legitimate representative of the Syrian people in opposition to the Assad regime,” he referred to 
it as a “big step.”97  It was a politically and economically significant event for the National 
Coalition to receive international recognition as the “representatives of the Syrian people.”  That 
designation, however, did not create any “new legal basis” for the United States to arm the 
Syrian rebels or intervene militarily against the Assad regime.
98
 
 The United States may be able to arm an insurgent group, without violating the non-
intervention principle of the United Nations, if the entity qualifies as a state.
99
  As a signatory to 
the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, the United States can only 
recognize a state if it fulfills four criteria.
100
  The entity seeking recognition must have  (a) a 
permanent population; (b) a defined territory the group controls; (c) a governing structure; and 
(d) the capacity to enter into relations with other states.
101
   
 The only way under international law the United States may find it legal to directly arm 
the rebels with lethal assistance is if the National Coalition gains control of a substantial part of 
Syrian territory and becomes “more inclusive and can legitimately claim to represent the 
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majority of Syrians.” 102   If the National Coalition fulfills those criteria and then requests 
weapons, there might be a legal basis for intervention in the Syrian conflict.
103
  Currently, any 
foreign military assistance or intervention would be viewed as an “illegal interference” into the 
internal affairs of Syria, a violation of the second principle of the Charter of the United 
Nations.
104
  
 President Obama granted the National Coalition political recognition because the United 
States determined that it was “reflective and representative enough of the Syrian people.”105  
Similarly, the United Kingdom recognized the National Coalition because it formed “a broad and 
representative Opposition that reflects the full diversity of the Syrian people.” 106   The 
international community was thus able to support the new Coalition because it increased its 
legitimacy and credibility among women, minorities, religious leaders, civil society and was able 
to gain the participation of the local councils.
107
  
 Although the Syrian National Coalition gained political recognition as the “legitimate 
representative of the Syrian people,” it has not received any formal diplomatic recognition.  
Unlike in the case of the Libyan uprising, neither the United States nor any other nation has been 
willing to formally recognize the Syrian opposition movement as the “government of Syria.”108  
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The international community continues to maintain formal diplomatic relations with the Assad 
government and treats his regime as the legal government of Syria.
109
     
 France, one of the first nations to supply the Libyan Transitional Council with financial 
assistance and military support, believed the Syria rebels have not “been as organized and have 
no hold on significant amounts of territory,” sufficient to serve as the government of Syria.110  
Although France granted permission to the National Coalition to appoint an ambassador to 
France, the new ambassador will not be able to use the Syrian embassy in France because it 
belongs to the Assad government.
111
   
 The Arab world has been more supportive of the National Coalition.  In February of 
2013, Qatar became the first nation to hand over a Syrian embassy and to provide full diplomatic 
status to the ambassador from the National Coalition.
112
  A month later, the Arab League 
formally handed over Syria’s seat to the National Coalition and allowed its member nations to 
arm the Syrian rebels.
113
  The National Coalition will not be able to acquire Syria’s seat in the 
United Nations, however, because Russia and China will likely block any attempts.
114
  At this 
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time, therefore, further diplomatic recognition will not help the National Coalition gain any 
further legitimacy.
115
  
 The National Coalition can further increase its legitimacy by acquiring “control and 
governance” of a substantial part of Syrian territory.116  Although the National Coalition claims 
to control territory that covers 100,000 square kilometers and includes 10 million residents or 40 
percent of the population, it must demonstrate it can adequately govern these areas better than 
the Islamic rebels.
117
  Currently, the opposition forces have “the upper hand” in the northern and 
eastern parts of Syria.
118
  The rebels also control over half of Aleppo, Syria’s largest city and 
most of the border crossings with Turkey and Iraq.
119
  But the Assad government has maintained 
control over the coasts and the Alawite Mountains and has fought off the rebels in Damascus.
120
  
In addition, President Assad still has considerable support from the Syrian population, but it 
remains to be seen if his support will be sustained.
121
  
 Many Christians, which constitute 10 percent of the population, and significant numbers 
of Druze and Kurds, support Assad because they believe he will protect the minorities better than 
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the Sunni opposition.
122
  In addition, the Alawite community, which constitutes 12 percent of the 
Syrian population, supports the Assad regime because he is an Alawite.
123
   
 The Alawites were a traditionally disadvantaged group prior to the Assad regime, but 
under the Assad regime they maintain a prominent role in the Syrian military and society and 
would be afraid to lose their privileged stature under a potentially Sunni Muslim government.
124
  
Although there have been considerable defections from the Syrian army, the Assad government 
has benefited from strong military support.
125
  Similar to the Arab Spring protests in Bahrain, if 
Assad can keep control of the military, the opposition will have a tough time ousting Assad.
126
 
 The United States believes the National Coalition must increase its legitimacy among the 
Syrian people and continue to prove that it can be a viable alternative to the Assad 
government.
127
  If the National Coalition can continue to unify itself, be inclusive of a broader 
range of Syrian communities and isolate the extremist elements of the opposition, there is a 
better chance the international community will feel it is legally permissible to arm the rebels.
128
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 Alternatively, the United States might be able to arm the rebels or militarily intervene in 
Syria using the precedent that the Clinton administration established with the 1999 NATO 
bombing campaign of Kosovo, which protected the Kosovars from further “ethnic cleansing” 
perpetrated by the Serbs and Slobodan Milosevic.
129
  Although most international lawyers did 
not view the intervention in Kosovo as “strictly legal,” they found it morally legitimate.130  
However, if the humanitarian atrocities continue in Syria, and the National Coalition does not 
meet the qualifications for recognition as the “government of Syria,” the United States may feel 
intervention is “morally, if not legally” justified.131 
 In March of 1999, after 300,000 Kosovars had been expelled from their homes and 
“ethnic cleansing” was commonly occurring, President Clinton authorized a NATO air strike 
against Serbia.
132
  NATO conducted more than 30,000 sorties over 11 weeks and impaired 
Serbia’s ability to wage war on the Kosovars.133  That campaign took place entirely without the 
authorization of the U.N. Security Council.
134
  In addition, the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia indicted Milosevic for crimes against humanity.
135
  The joint military 
and diplomatic campaign forced Serbia to withdraw its troops from Kosovo.
136
  The campaign’s 
success allowed 700,000 Kosovars to return home two weeks after the fighting ended.
137
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 In addition, the international community used this humanitarian model to authorize an 
Australian led military force to help East Timor in their secession from Indonesia in 1999.
138
  
Similar regional military forces with the assistance of the U.N. or European powers were used to 
protect citizens in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast).
139
   
 Similar to Kosovo, Syria faces an immense humanitarian crisis.  Almost three and a half 
million Syrians have been displaced from their homes.
140
  If diplomacy fails, President Obama 
might be able to apply the moral precedent used in Kosovo and intervene in Syria to prevent 
further massacres.
141
 
  
  V. Suggestions for the National Coalition and Potential Problems 
 
 The long-term viability of the National Coalition will be based on its ability to expand its 
operations from exile in Cairo and develop a governing structure on the ground in Syria that can 
lead the Syrian people.
142
  It must take a proactive role in shaping the future of all diplomatic, 
political and military decisions in Syria, whether or not the Assad government falls.
143
  
 In December of 2012, the National Coalition formed a military arm with the Supreme 
Military Council that has the support of 260 rebel commanders.
144
  In order to demonstrate their 
effectiveness as a broad based governing body, the National Coalition must further expand its 
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military arm and unite it with the Free Syrian Army and other rebel groups.
145
  This body must 
establish itself as a moderate opposition movement that can control the fighters and prevent the 
jihadist rebels from gaining control of Syrian territory.
146
  
  Although there is no official count of rebel brigades, they have been prominently 
involved in crucial battles in Aleppo, Homs and Damascus.
147
  The jihadists rebels, however, 
could represent as much as half of the armed rebels and have joined forces to form the Liberation 
Front for Syria.
148
  The Islamist brigades also have been receiving the majority of the arms 
shipments that Qatar and Saudi Arabia donated to the rebels.
149
   
 The potential that the fall of Assad could create a vacuum that would allow Al-Qaeda and 
other Sunni Muslims extremists to gain control of Syria has caused hesitation in the international 
community’s support for the National Coalition.150  Some commentators even believe that the 
only certain outcome from the Syrian uprising is that the jihadists will have a major presence in 
Syria.
151
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 In addition, the National Coalition must also gain the trust and respect of the minorities 
including Alawites, Christians, Druze and Kurds.
152
  It must be able to convince them that it can 
function as a viable government that will protect the rights of those groups in case the Assad 
government falls.  The National Coalition must begin to demonstrate their effectiveness as a 
future transitional government by securely delivering medical and humanitarian aid to the four 
million Syrians who are in need of assistance.
153
  As National Coalition Chairman al-Khatib 
admitted, “much of the relief aid has been stolen or looted by gangs exploiting the security 
anarchy.”154    
 The National Coalition must improve the delivery of humanitarian aid or the Islamist 
rebel groups who have been quicker and more efficient delivering humanitarian aid to the rebel 
controlled areas will dominate any transitional body.
155
  These issues have led to limited non-
lethal aid for the National Coalition and the recent resignation of Mouaz al-Khatib, the leader of 
the National Coalition since its beginning stages.
156
  If the National Coalition can successfully 
adopt these measures, it will play a much more prominent role in Syria’s future.  
 
   VI. Larger Lessons from the Syrian Arab Spring 
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 The so-called Arab Spring has been portrayed in the media as “popular uprisings with 
democratic aspirations.”157  Revolutions usually consist of “many groups hostile to the existing 
government, but not necessarily for the same reason.”158  In the case of the Syria uprising, former 
United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger argues that the Syrian Arab Spring is not a 
battle between democracy and a dictatorship, but a “fight of various ethnic groups for 
preeminence.”159   
 Although one report found that out of the Arab Spring countries, Libya had the smallest 
hope for democracy, the Syrian people’s chance for developing a true democracy are not that 
much greater.
160
  In a post-Assad world, the lack of existing political structures in Syria will 
present great obstacles in the establishment of any model of democratic governance.
161
  Since the 
Syrian people have suffered under a quasi-totalitarian rule for 43 years, they will face an uphill 
battle to establish a political system, a democracy or authoritarian rule.
162
  According to the 
2011-2012 World Press Freedom Index, Syria is ranked 176th out of 179 nations in press 
freedom.
163
  Syria was also ranked 164th out of 167 nations on the Economist’s 2012 Democracy 
Index.
164
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 Unlike Libya, the Syrian Revolution is not a conflict between the Assad regime and the 
rest of the nation.
165
  Both the Assad government and the rebels have supporters, and there are 
many Syrians who do not like the regime, but are concerned about a future Syria under a jihadist 
rule.
166
  If it was a classical revolution to overthrow a dictator, some argue, Assad would be dead 
or out of power.
167
  
  The unstable nature of the insurgency has caused the United States and other nations to 
take a cautiously optimistic approach in dealing with the Syrian Opposition.  Although the 
United States is wary of arming the rebels, it announced that it would not protest the lifting of the 
European Union (“EU”) arms embargo, which is scheduled to expire at the end of May 2013, 
unless all 27 of its members renew it.
168
  Recently, the EU amended the sanctions to provide 
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armored vehicles, non-lethal military assistance and technical aid to the opposition hoping it 
would protect the Syrian people.
169
 
 Although the United States has not committed to arm the rebels, it has been, along with 
British and French instructors, participating in the military training of senior Syrian army officers 
who defected.
170
  The goal of the training is to eventually provide a “safe haven” for Syrian 
refugees and to provide a “counterweight” to the extremist rebel forces in the Northern parts of 
Syria.
171
  In addition, the United States doubled their pledge to $250 million in non-lethal 
assistance to the National Coalition and other civil society groups, including communications 
and computer equipment, generators and medical supplies.
172
  
 Proponents of arming the rebels argue that the lack of arms shipments to the rebels has 
caused negative military and political repercussions.  The decision to not arm the rebels has 
allowed the jihadists to grow stronger and caused the United States to lose out on an opportunity 
to develop strategic relationships that could be valuable in a crucial post-Assad transitional 
period.
173
  This viewpoint also argues that weapons should be given to the rebels to offset the 
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military support that Assad has received from Iran and Russia, which has allowed him to survive 
two years of uprisings.
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structure that can work together with the provisional councils to administer the rebel controlled 
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